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CONFLICT OF LAWS-ALLOWANCE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER THE LAW OF A FOREIGN
JURISDICTION
The Laburnum Construction Corporation was a Virginia
Company under contract with the Richmond Building and Con-
struction Trades Council, an affiliate of the American Federation
of Labor, whereby it agreed to employ, if obtainable, only members
of that federation when working in an area over which a union of
that federation had jurisdiction. Pond Creek Pocahontas Company'
awarded the plaintiff a contract for the construction of mining
facilities in Breathitt County, Kentucky. The necessary labor was
supplied by, and with the consent of, the nearest local member of
the American Federation of Labor. The United Construction
Workers, a member of the United Mine Workers, threatened plain-
tiff that, unless an agreement be made with the United Construction
workers, they would close down all of the plaintiff's work in Breathitt
County. Because of the prior contract with the American Feder-
ation of Labor no agreement was made with the defendants, who
then so intimidated the plaintiff's employees that work ceased and
the coal companies, fearing action by the United Mine Workers,
cancelled the construction contracts with Laburnum. A tort action
was instituted against the United Construction Workers, and the
jury awarded plaintiffs $175,437.19 compensatory damages and
punitive damages of $"100,000.00, making a total of $275,437.19.
On appeal, held, that $146,111.10 of the award for compensatory
damages was' not supported by the evidence, but the balance of the
judgment, in the amount of $129,326.09, affirmed with interest.
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corpora-
tion, 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953).
The point meriting consideration is the manner in which the
Supreme Court of Appeals proceeded to award punitive damages
to the plaintiffs. In the basic analysis this case involves a conflict of
laws problem, which the court recognized' but improperly treated.
The primary element completely overlooked was the proper char-
acterization" of the problem.
Characterization has been defined as the "determination of
the nature of the problem."" Robertson, who has written a book on
1. 194 Va. 872. 886. 75 S.L2d 694. 704 (1953).
2. Also sometimes referred to as "qualifiatioa" or "laificatioa".
3. Comack Reovoi, Cbararwizaoui Locauizio. &ud Pdlwiswv Qsuwtiosi gubs Co0-
INa of .Za,, 14 So.CaLL.ev. 221, 223 (1941).
this subject,' states, "The -function of primary characterization is
to put upori the facts a legal complexion, or allot them to a legal
category, which will have a choice of law rule available for the
disposition of the case."'
It is a well-settled rule that one jurisdiction will not enforce
the penal laws of another.' Thus, the initial question that should
have been considered in this case is whether exemplary damages
are penal.' This question must be answered by the conflict of laws
rule of each state for itself and not by looking to the jurisdiction
whose law will be applied." Characterization is important only
when there is a conflict of authority as to the nature of the prob-
lem," and whether exemplary damages are penal or not involves
such a conflict.' Once the proper approach has been taken to the
problem, the real nature of exemplary damages must be considered.
Whether a particular jurisdiction will find such damages penal
depends upon the definition of penal accepted by that jurisdiction."
In Adams v. Fitchburg Railroad Co." the court held a statute
of Massachusetts to be penal, using in substance the test that
whether a statute is penal depends upon whether the main purpose
of the statute is to give compensation or to inflict punishment.?
"A statute may be penal although the entire amount recovered be
given directly to the party injured. 1' The second definition that
has been given to the term "penal" was set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of Huntington v. Attrill,"
wherein it is stated, "The question whether a statute of one State,
which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in the
international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of
another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is
to punish an offense against the public justice of the State, or to
afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act."'
4. Robertson. Characterizaion in the Conflict of Lams (Harvard University Press. 1940).
5. Id. at 61.
-6. The Antelope. 10 Wheat. 66. 123 (U.S. 1825); 3 Beale. Conflict of Laws §611.1
t 1935); Restatement. Conflict of Laws §611 (1934).
7. rormack . supra note 3. at 223.
8. Robertson, sapra note 4. at 186.
9. Cormack. supnra note 3. at 227.
10. See.Goodrich. Coflicts of Laws §12 (3rd ed. 1949); 2 Beale. Conflict of Laws
§421.1 (1935).
11. Minor, Conflic of Laws, pp. 22-25 (1901); Goodrich. Conflia of Laws 112; 3
Eerie, Confic of Lan 3611.3; Leflar. Extratate Enforcement of Penl ad Govems-
mentd Claims, 46 Harv.LRev. 193, 203 (1932).
12. 67 Vt. 76. 20 A. 687. 48 Am.St.Rep. 800 (1894).
13. See Nelson's Adm'r. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 88 Va. 971, 974. 14 S.E. 838,
15 LELA. 583, 586 (1892).
14. 67 Vc. 76. - 30 A. 687. 688. 48 Am.Sr.Rep. 800. 803 (1894).
15. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
16. Id. at 673.
Virginia, in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. American Exchange
Bank," apparently accepted the latter view. The court states, "In
order to come within the scope of that principle, the action or suit
must be in the nature of a proceeding in favor of the State whose
laws have been violated." 8
Let us assume that a cause of action is brought in Virginia
upon a death caused by an accident in Massachusetts, whose laws
covering this type of mishap are construed by the Massachusetts
courts to be penal.'" Using the reasoning applied in the LaburnIuM
case, the court upon analyzing the law to be penal in Massachusetts
would not give effect to the statute. Yet the test as set forth in
Nelson's Adnt'r. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. is, "Is the foreign
statute contrary to the known policy, or prejudicial to the interests,
of the state in which the suit is brought? [Italics added] And if
it is not, then it makes no difference whether the right asserted be
given by the common law or by statute."' The court went on to
apply West Virginia's death by wrongful act law in this case. Thus,
by following the Laburnum reasoning the court would have reached
a result contra to the expressed rule.
The famous case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York'
presents an excellent example of characterization where the issue
was whether a statute which allowed exemplary damages for a
wrongful death was penal. The statute in question was that of
Massachusetts and had been determined penal in several juris-
dictions, while in others it had been considered remedial. Judge
Cardozo in handing down the decision had this to say: "The courts
of Massachusetts have said that the question [whether penal or
not] is still an open one.. .No matter how they may have char-
acterized the act as penal, they have not meant to hold that it is
penal for every purpose.. .Even without that reservation by them,
the essential purpose of the statute would be a question for our
courts. ' " The court went on to hold the law not penal and per-
mitted damages to be assessed.
17. 92 Va. 495, 23 S.E. 935 (1896).18. Id. at 502, 23 S E. 935. 937. No mention is made of the Nelson case (sUvra, note13) wherein the court stated ". . . the statute is not penal, but compensatory in its
the dls ject bei g to give a remedy for certain injuries, not as a punishment to
19. See Arnold v. Jacobs. 316 Mass. 81. 54 N.E.2d 922 (1944).20. 88 Va. 971, 975, 14 S.M 838, 839, 15 LR.A. 583. 586 (1892); Norfolk &Western Ry. Co. v. Denny's Adm'r., 106 Va. 383, 56 S.E. 321 (1907).21. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
22. Id. at 103, 120 N.E. 198, 199.
The court in the Laburnum case, supra, did cite two cases"
which presented the Virginia rules as to the grounds for the im-
position of punitive damages on the wrongdoer." However, neither
involves a conflict of laws question. The fact that Virginia does
award punitive damages shows that the allowance of them is not
contra to our public policy, but this does not say that the use of
another state's rule as to such damages is not penal when applied
in Virginia. For example, our criminal laws express our policy as
to unlawful acts. However, even though another state's criminal
law is similar and its policy therefore the same, Virginia courts
would not enforce the foreign law.'
It is submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeals should
properly characterize conflict of laws problems, where a conflict
of authority as to the nature of the problem exists, and it is to be
hoped that in an appropriate case it will answer the question as to
whether or not punitive damages are penal. A decision such as
that arrived at in the Laburnum case could be justified in Virginia
by applying the meaning of a penal action as set forth in Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry Co. v. American Exchange Bank, supra. The court
would do well to consider the entire question of extra-state en-
forcement of penal law. As a result, the rule against such enforce-
ment might be eliminated," but in any event such an examination
would go far in helping the court to arrive at a proper conclusion."
Peter Shebell, Jr.
23. Anchor Co. v. Adams. 139 Va. 388, 124 S.E. 458 (1924); Stubbs v. Cowden.
179 Va. 190. 18 S.E.2d 275 (1942).
24. 194 Va. 872, 894, 895. 75 S.E.2d 694, 708. 709 (1953).
25. Nelson's Adm'r. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.. 88 Va. 971, 974. 14 S.E. 838.
15 LR.A. 583. 586 (1892).
26. See Leflar. &rtastae Enforcemen: of Pean and Govrammal Cla"ms, 46 Har.L
Rev. 193 (1932). It is suggested in this article that no really sound reasons exist
for refusal to enforce anoer jurisdiction's laws because they are penal. per se.
27. Se 3 Beale, Conflics of Laws §611.3. wherein he states, "'In considering the problem
of extra-state enforcement of penal law the courts have unfortnately placed the
entire emphasis on an attempt to define the meaning of the term. In most of the
cases at least it would seem that an elaboration of the reason for the rule would not
only have been more enlightening generally but also more helpful to the court in
arriving at the proper result." See also Cheatham, Isterfa Law Distincsionr is tb
Cotaia of Laws, 21 Corn.LQ. 570 (1936).
